Trial selection is on trial

Matthew T. Mangino
Youngstown Vindicator
January 8, 2012


The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees, to every person accused of a crime, the right to a trial by jury. That right is also ingrained in Article I of the Ohio Constitution. In fact, Ohio is one of only 21 states that continue to leave the request for a jury trial exclusively in the hands of the defendant. However, not every defendant wants to face a jury.

There are a number of tactical reasons that would require a defendant to request a trial in front of a judge as opposed to a jury. A defendant raising technical legal claims may prefer a learned judge over a group of laymen unfamiliar with the nuances of the law.

A defendant with a lengthy criminal record may prefer a judge who has seen many defendants with checkered pasts as opposed to jurors new to the realities of the criminal justice system.

Unfair bias

At times, a crime is so heinous that a jury may be repulsed by the facts. A defendant may choose to take her chances with a judge and avoid the unfair bias that comes with the appalling circumstances of some crimes.
Finally, some defense attorneys judge shop. If the case is assigned to a judge who has been known to be lenient in certain circumstances, the defense will seek a trial in front of that judge without a jury.

Therein lays the concern, for some, with Ohio’s law. While the law is clear that a defendant is entitled to a trial by jury, there is no corresponding “right” for a defendant to demand a trial in front of a judge. Nearly a half century ago, the U.S. Supreme Court held that there is no constitutional right to a criminal trial in front of a judge. Yet that is precisely what happens in Ohio. The prosecution has no options once a defendant waives a trial by jury. That may soon change.

The Legislature is considering H.B. 265. The bill seeks to condition the defendant’s ability to waive a jury trial on the consent of the prosecutor and court. Essentially the bill would empower prosecutors to demand a jury trial, thus giving them veto power over a defendant’s attempt to waive the right.

Although the District of Columbia, the federal government and most states have similar laws that limit a defendant’s exclusive right to select the form of trial, this bill is not without its detractors.

Some suggest that H.B. 265 would supersede the authority of the Supreme Court Commission on the Rules of Practice and Procedure. A Judicial Impact Statement prepared by the Ohio Judicial Conference suggested, “Although the General Assembly may desire to express its will that prosecutors also be able to demand a trial by jury, the General Assembly does not have the authority to establish court procedures in conflict with an existing Ohio Rule of Criminal Procedure.”

The Supreme Court Commission overwhelmingly refused to provide prosecutors the right to demand a jury trial over the objection of defendants, finding that to do so would be “patently unfair to defendants.” The position of the Judicial Conference is that the H.B. 265 cannot be implemented because the Ohio Constitution expressly granted the authority to oversee the courts to the Ohio Supreme Court.

Ballot-box issue

There may be another way to get this done. In 1998 Pennsylvania voters approved a constitutional amendment. The question presented to the voters was simple: “Shall the Pennsylvania Constitution be amended to provide that the Commonwealth shall have the same right to a trial by jury in criminal case as does the accused?”

A constitutional amendment may be the only way to provide Ohio prosecutors with the same authority.

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The Cautionary Instruction: Prison reform promotes lcoal control

Matthew T. Mangino
The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette/Ipso Facto
October 28, 2011

On September 28, 2008, then-Governor Edward G. Rendell signed into law a series of prison reform measures, known in part as Act 81. The reforms were intended to reduce costs, ease county jail overcrowding, improve treatment services and among other things provide for the compassionate release of terminally ill inmates. Not all of the reforms have met with success.
A provision of Act 81, Place of Confinement -- 42 Pa.C.S.A. 9762, is scheduled to take effect on November 24, 2011. The new law provides that sentences with maximums between two and five years must be served in a state prison. However, under specific circumstances a judge can order the sentence to be served in a county jail. That is not entirely new. What is new is that the sentencing judge will retain jurisdiction for purposes of parole, not the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole.
Act 81 provides that offenders sentenced to a term of two years or more, but less than five years may be confined in a county jail if: (1) the county prison warden certifies that the county jail is at less than 110% of capacity; (2) the district attorney has consented to the confinement; and (3) the sentencing court has approved the placement in the county jail.
According to data compiled by the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing, in 2009 7,860 sentences included a maximum term of two years or greater but less than five years; of these, 6,080 were committed to a state correctional facility, and 1,205 were committed to county jails. The remaining 575 sentences were state intermediate punishment.
What are the implications for offenders? Initially, an offender who has local ties to the community will be more accessible for purposes of visitation while in a county jail. That is not always the case in the state correctional system. With 28 correctional facilities across the commonwealth some state inmates find themselves far away from family and friends.
An offender serving a sentence in the county jail may also have available the privilege of work release. An offender with a family to support could continue to work while serving her sentence. This often eases a significant burden placed on the non-incarcerated parent.
Administratively the most significant change brought about by the new law is that judges will now make parole decisions, not the Parole Board; and local county probation offices will supervise those offenders after parole instead of the Parole Board.
Criminal defense practitioners should be eager to explore the benefits of Act 81. The trick may be getting a feel for the administrative aspects of the new law. A provision of the reform package provided that the Sentencing Commission would establish parole guidelines for the Parole Board and for judges who invariably will be making more parole decisions. Those guidelines have not yet been established, although the Parole Board has been utilizing internal parole guidelines since 1980.

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U.S. Supreme Court Takes Another Look at Plea Bargains

Matthew T. Mangino
Pennsylvania Law Weekly
October 18, 2011

This fall, the U.S. Supreme Court will hear a pair of cases that have the potential to impact the way criminal defense attorneys interact with their clients with regard to pleading guilty or going to trial.

In Blaine Lafler v. Anthony Cooper , the court will consider whether an attorney's advice to his criminal client to reject a favorable plea bargain based on an incorrect understanding of the law was ineffective assistance of counsel. In Missouri v. Galin E. Frye , the court will consider whether counsel's failure to disclose the terms of a favorable plea offer is a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial.

Frye was charged with a felony for driving with a revoked license. He was appointed a public defender, Michael Coles. The district attorney sent Coles a letter offering a reduced charge and 90 days in jail. Coles received the letter and made written notations. However, Coles never communicated with Frye regarding the letter and therefore Frye never learned of the plea offer.

Frye subsequently made an open plea and was sentenced to three years in prison. He filed a claim pursuant to the Sixth Amendment alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court of Appeals agreed and the appeal by the State of Missouri followed.

In Cooper's case, the prosecutor communicated a verbal plea offer to Cooper's attorney, Brian McClain. Pursuant to the offer, Cooper would plead to assault with intent to murder with a recommended sentence of 51 to 85 months in prison. Cooper would have accepted the plea because he "was guilty."

However, Cooper's attorney talked him out of accepting the plea based on a misunderstanding of the law. McClain incorrectly thought because the victim was shot below the waist the state could not establish the element of intent. McClain thought a better plea deal would come closer to trial. Instead, Cooper went to trial and the jury found him guilty on all charges. He was sentenced to 185 to 360 months in prison.There are two questions confronting the U.S. Supreme Court. Initially, could defense counsel's incorrect advice during the plea bargaining process or failure to convey a plea offer establish a successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim? Second, what remedy can the court impose once a successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim is made with regard to the inadequate legal representation during plea negotiations?

The state and federal government argue that the purpose of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel is to ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial — a trial that reliably determines the defendant's guilt or innocence.

In Cooper , the government suggests that he was convicted after a fair trial, and advice to forgo a guilty plea, including a plea bargain, did not "deprive the defendant of any substantive or procedural right to which the law entitles him."

The argument continues: "First, a not-guilty plea is merely an assertion of the defendant's constitutional right to a trial; unlike a guilty plea, a not-guilty plea does not waive anything and does not produce a conviction."

The state argues errors made in the plea bargaining process are not prejudicial. Apparently the government does not believe that plea negotiations are a critical stage of a proceeding that requires effective assistance of counsel.

That assertion is difficult to reconcile with the current reality of America's criminal justice system. Recently, The New York Times provided a host of statistics that underscores the shift from a trial-dominated system to a plea-dominated system. The National Center for State Courts found that the percentage of felonies taken to trial, in the nine states with available data, fell to 2.3 percent in 2009, down from eight percent in 1976. That is fewer than one in 40 felony cases — 35 years ago the ratio was about one in 12.

The shift is even clearer on the federal level. In 1977, the ratio of guilty pleas to criminal trial verdicts in federal district courts was a little more than four to one; by last year, it was almost 32 to one.
The U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized that a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain, and even if an agreement is reached, the prosecution and the judge have discretion to reject that plea bargain before the defendant gains any enforceable right. However, the landscape has changed. For most defendants the most critical stage of a criminal matter is not trial, but rather the negotiation of a favorable plea.

The court has begun to recognize that effective lawyering is crucial during the interaction between counsel and client during the plea bargaining process.

In Padilla v. Kentucky , the Supreme Court found that defense counsel's failure to correctly warn his client about deportation consequences was ineffective assistance of counsel.

As the law currently exists there is little protection for defendants trying to comprehend and navigate the complex issues involved in negotiating a plea. The process can be daunting. The negotiation may seem harried with unsophisticated defendants dealing with defense lawyers and prosecutors who are very familiar with the process.

Stephanos Bibas wrote in Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer , "It is astonishing that a $100 credit-card purchase of a microwave oven is regulated more carefully than a guilty plea that results in years of imprisonment."

Bibas argued it would not take much to extend the consumer protection analogy to plea bargains. Bibas further argued that the legislature could procedurally "ensure a modicum of understanding and advice."
The court may well find, pursuant to Strickland v. Washington , that Cooper and Frye were not afforded effective assistance of counsel. The second question may be more difficult — the remedy. The state and federal government argue that it would be illogical to provide a remedy to Cooper and Frye when they have no constitutional right to a plea.

How does the court make Cooper and Frye whole? Do they get new trials? That puts them in the same position they are in now. Do they get the original plea offer? That might be a benefit that could have theoretically eluded them. The judge could have rejected the plea. Do they get some modified plea agreements? The fairness of that is certainly in question. The government's brief argues, "Courts cannot recreate the balance of risks and incentives on both sides that existed prior to trial."

The appropriate remedy would appear to require Cooper and Frye to accept the original plea offers made by the respective prosecutors. This is the only remedy which returns the men to the position they were prior to the ineffective assistance of counsel. As Frye's counsel argues in his brief to the U.S. Supreme Court, "The object of the remedy for ineffective assistance is to 'identify and neutralize the taint by tailoring relief appropriate in the circumstances to assure the defendant the effective assistance of counsel.'"

Cooper and Frye are scheduled to be argued before the U.S. Supreme Court on Oct. 31. 

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